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JUSTICE or MERCY?
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ust days before leaving office on January 11, 2003, II-
inois Governor George Ryan commuted the sentenc-
es of every inmate on Illinois' death row. In total, 167
convicts were taken off death row and given life sentences
without the possibility of parole. It was not an act of mercy
Governor Ryan's actions came in the wake of a three-year
study showing that the State of Illinois had executed 12
people since the reinstitution of the death penalty in 1977,
and during the same period, the state had released 13 people
based on new evidence that demonstrated their innocence.
Given that Illinois had exonerated more men than it had ex-
ecuted, Governor Ryan professed the Illinois criminal justice
system broken. Speaking at Northwestern University School
of Law, Governor Ryan said, "Our capital system is haunted
by the demon of error--error in determining guilt, and er-
ror in determining who among the guilty deserves to die." In
justifying his actions, Governor Ryan recognized that he was
the last resort in the criminal justice system for those facing
the ultimate penalty in his state and said he was constitu-
tionally mandated under the state constitution to ensure that
justice was served. Invoking his broad executive power, Ryan
stated:
The Governor has the constitutional role in our state
of acting in the interest of justice and fairness. Our
state constitution provides broad power to the Gov-
ernor to issue reprieves, pardons and commutations.
Our Supreme Court has reminded inmates petition-
ing them that while errors and fairness questions may
actually exist and cannot be recognized under judicial
rules and procedural mandates, the last resort for relief
is the Governor.
(Gov. George H. Ryan, Clemency Address, Northwestern
University School of Law, Jan. 11, 2003.)
Governor Ryan's rebuke of the Illinois capital punish-
ment system and his subsequent grant of clemency were
broad both in scope and in justification, expressing the view
that Illinois governors are constitutionally mandated under
the state constitution to exercise their power to effectuate
justice. If the justifications for the exercise of executive clem-
ency were placed on a continuum of ideological frameworks
through which clemency has or should be based, Governor
Ryan's actions in 2003 exist on the polar end of the contin-
uum. On the other end of the continuum-and the basis on
which most acts of clemency are justified today-is the idea
that clemency is an executive act of mercy, not a continua-
tion of the criminal justice process. This view was articulated
by former California Governor Pete Wilson in the Brenda
Aris case.
In 1993, Governor Wilson commuted the sentence of
Brenda Aris, a woman convicted of murder in the shooting
death of her husband, a batterer who had subjected her to
horrendous abuse for 12 years. Aris, who was held captive in
her own home by her drug and alcohol abusing spouse, suf-
fered debilitating injuries such as cracked ribs and a broken
jaw as well as psychological abuse. (People v. Aris, 215 Cal.
App. 3d 1178 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).) After serving nearly five
years of her sentence, Aris petitioned Governor Wilson for
clemency, arguing that because the trial court had refused
to allow an expert to testify about the effects of "battered
woman's syndrome" she had been denied a fair trial.
Unlike Governor Ryan, Governor Wilson did not inter-
pret his executive clemency power broadly. Instead he ex-
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pressed the view that clemency is a matter of mercy reserved
for those demonstrating remorse and rehabilitation and not
a mechanism through which judicial deficiencies may be
reviewed. In response to Aris's application, he said, "clem-
ency is not a continuation of the criminal justice process ...
Mercy is not about a legal analysis of [battered woman's syn-
drome] [and] I am not in a position to retry criminal cases or
to speculate as to what might have been if different evidence
were before the jury." (Office of the Governor, State of Cali-
fornia, Decision in the Matter of the Clemency Request of
Brenda Aris 4 (May 27, 1993).) In the end, Wilson did have
mercy on Aris and commuted her sentence from 15 years to
life to 12 years to life-releasing her for time served. He said,
"I have considered and sympathized with the pain and terror
[Brenda Aris] must have suffered during the many episodes
of violence she most certainly endured" (Id.)
The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that the states are
not constitutionally required under the federal Constitution
to provide any clemency mechanism, and that each state is
free to adopt its own clemency scheme. (See Herrera v. Col-
lins, 506 U.S. 390, 414 (1993).) Although it might appear, in
comparing the statements of Governors Ryan and Wilson,
that the Illinois Constitution grants broader clemency power
than the California Constitution, this is not true. The lan-
guage of the two provisions is nearly identical. With limited
exceptions, both Article V, § 13 of the Illinois Constitution
and Article V, § 8 of the California Constitution bestow upon
the governor the sole authority to issue pardons, reprieves,
and commutations "on such terms as he thinks proper" in
Illinois, and "on conditions the Governor deems proper" in
California. The difference is ideological, not semantic.
The ideological tension between the two views, that clem-
ency is a pure act of mercy on the one hand, and Governor
Ryan's assertion that the pardoning power is "constitution-
ally mandated" and integral to the criminal justice system on
the other, is significant. The "mercy" interpretation presup-
poses that the judiciary got it right; that the person receiving
clemency (whether it be a full unconditional pardon or the
commutation of a death sentence) committed the criminal
act and was properly convicted. Notwithstanding this pre-
sumption of correctness, under the "mercy" interpretation,
clemency may be warranted due to mitigating circumstanc-
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es, such as in the Aris case (where fairness dictated that the
imposed sentence was overly harsh), or due to a finding of
rehabilitation (where a person has demonstrated exemplary
behavior postconviction and should be forgiven in the eyes
of the law). The "constitutional mandate" interpretation on
the other hand, does not assume the system always gets it
right. It presumes instead that in any system of laws unan-
ticipated circumstances arise that the legal system is unable
to correctly and justly resolve and that the purpose of the
executive pardoning power is to serve as a safety net when
that happens.
Exercising his executive power strictly on the basis of mer-
cy, Wilson expressed compassion for Brenda Aris's suffering.
Under the "constitutional mandate" analysis, however, he
could also have found clemency legally mandated. Without
an expert to help the jurors understand Aris's fear from the
standpoint of her experience, the jury did not have the tools
it needed to fairly consider her defense. While the crucial na-
ture of the expert's testimony may not have been commonly
understood at the time Aris was tried, psychological stud-
ies supporting her claim were widely known when Governor
Wilson considered her clemency petition. An expert testi-
fying today would testify that a woman in Aris's situation,
with her history of abuse and facing a new threat from her
abuser, could reasonably fear serious bodily harm or death in
circumstances that might appear unreasonable to someone
outside the relationship. Had Wilson acted under the "con-
stitutionally mandate" theory, he would have been exercising
his executive power in a manner consistent with what Chief
Justice Rehnquist explained as its intended purpose, an "his-
toric remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice... deeply
rooted in our Anglo-American tradition of law." (U.S. v.
Herrera, 506 U.S. at 411-12.)
Whatever views one holds on the fallibility of the criminal
justice system, the ideological differences exhibited by Gov-
ernors Ryan and Wilson create a false dichotomy. The ra-
tionale underlying the clemency power is not an "either/or"
proposition. The historical reality is that the clemency power
is extraordinarily broad-having constitutional underpin-
nings, yet premised on the idea that the executive should pos-
sess tremendous discretion in this area-and encompasses
both rationales. (See Kathleen Ridolfi, Not Just an Act of
Mercy: The Demise of Post-Conviction Relief and a Rightful
Claim to Clemency, 24 N.YU. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 43,
52-64 (1998) (discussing the evolution of the rationale under-
lying the federal clemency power in the U.S. Supreme Court
and the debate during the California Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1849); see also, pages 9-12 infra.) The point is that the
clemency power is not only flexible enough to be exercised as
both an act of mercy and as the "fail-safe" for an imperfect
criminal justice system but there is ample support from both
the Supreme Court and the Constitution that dictates it be
exercised broadly.
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For reasons that include its existence outside the judicial
process and its potential political cost to the executive who
exercises it, clemency has too often been passed over as an
avenue for postconviction relief This article intends to en-
courage the use of this vital resource, so critical now given
the severe limitations imposed by the Antiterrorism and Ef-
fective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). We begin by
defining the terminology-often confused by courts and
legislators and include both a historical overview and an
overview of current state procedures underscoring its value
as a method of relief in postconviction innocence cases. (See
Table infra, (providing a list of the constitutional and legisla-
tive provisions governing the clemency power in each state;
the clemency structure in each state, i.e., whether the state
constitution vests the clemency power in the governor, an ex-
ecutive board, or some combination of the two; and a brief
overview of the steps an applicant must take under each
state's procedural rules governing clemency).)
Definition and Types
While the term "clemency" may first bring to mind an act of
grace, or a deed of mercy, leniency, or forgiveness, "clemen-
cy" has had much broader application. The National Center
for State Courts (a not-for-profit organization that provides
data to state courts and receives funding from governmen-
tal entities such as the Department of Justice) has identified
the following grounds pursuant to which clemency has been
granted:
" to correct hard cases (even under optimum condi-
tions, exceptional cases arise that cannot be left to
legally prescribed rules; laws cannot be drafted that
will fit every conceivable situation);
* to correct unduly severe sentences;
* for mitigating circumstances;
* for innocence or dubious guilt;
" in death penalty cases;
* for physical condition;
" to restore civil rights;
* to prevent deportations;
" for political purposes and for reasons of state;
" for turning state's evidence; and
" for services to the state.
(National Center for State Courts, Clemency: Legal Author-
ity, Procedure, and Structure xvi (Dec. 1977).)
The term "clemency," sometimes used interchangeably
with "pardon," is actually an umbrella term encompassing
the various mechanisms through which an executive can re-
mit the consequences of a crime. These mechanisms include
a pardon, commutation of sentence, reprieve, or remission
of fines and forfeitures
Pardon. A pardon is the broadest of the clemency mecha-
nisms and is an official nullification of punishment or other
legal consequences of a crime. "The term pardon is first
found in early French law and derives from the Late Latin
perdonare ('to grant freely'), suggesting a gift bestowed by the
sovereign. It has thus come to be associated with a somewhat
personal concession by a head of state to the perpetrator of
an offense, in mitigation or remission of the full punishment
that he has merited." (Leslie Sebba, Amnesty and Pardon, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 59 (Sanford H. Kadish
ed., 1983).) Like all legal concepts, the definition and scope
of the pardon power has evolved over time. Recognizing the
"mercy" and "constitutional mandate" rationales described
above, American Jurisprudence defines the pardon as:
• ..an act of grace, bestowed by the government
through its duly authorized officers or department,
and is designed to relieve an individual from the un-
foreseen injustice, because of extraordinary facts and
circumstances peculiar to the case, of applying the
punishment provided in a general statute which, under
ordinary circumstances, is just and beneficial. How-
ever, a pardon is more than a mere act of private grace
proceeding from an individual having the power to
exercise it, and is a part of the constitutional scheme;
properly granted, it is also an act of justice, supported
by a wise public policy.
(59 AM. JuR 2D PARDON AND PAROLE § 1 (internal citations
omitted).)
Commutation. A commutation of sentence "is a perma-
nent reduction in degree or amount of punishment." (Way
v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 3d 165, 176 (1977).) A com-
mutation of punishment differs from a pardon in that a com-
mutation changes one sentence to another whereas a pardon
"absolves a defendant of the crime altogether." (Colwell v.
State, 112 Nev. 807 (1996).)
Reprieve. A reprieve is the most limited form of clemency
and temporarily postpones the execution of a sentence for
a definite time. A reprieve does not "defeat the ultimate ex-
ecution of the judgment of the court, but merely delays it
temporarily." (59 AM. JuR. 2d § 4.)
Evolution of the Clemency Power
In the arena of postconviction remedies "the power to par-
don is the law's oldest mechanism for securing the release of
an offender, dating back to the time when a supreme mon-
arch possessed absolute control over the power to punish."
(Clifford Dome and Kenneth Gewerth, Mercy in a Climate
of Retributive Justice: Interpretations from a National Survey
of Executive Clemency Procedures, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM.
& CIV. CON. 413,417 (1999).) One of the leading legal schol-
ars in the field has described clemency as "a living fossil, a
relic from the days when an all-powerful monarch possessed
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the power to punish and to remit punishment as an act of
mercy." (Daniel T Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained, 69
TEx. L. REv. at 575.)
Although exercises of the clemency power can be traced
back to antiquity, like most American law, the U.S. concep-
tion of clemency derives from our English common-law
heritage. At the time of the Declaration of Independence in
1776, more than 200 crimes carried mandatory death sen-
tences in England. (Alyson Dinsmore, Clemency in Capital
Cases: The Need to Ensure Meaningful Review, 49 UCLA L.
REv. 1825, 1829 (2002).) "To offset the harshness and rigidity
of mandatory death sentences, wide discretion to give clem-
ency was granted to the executive." (Id.) It has been noted
that one of the purposes of exercising the clemency power
under these circumstances "was to consolidate the monarch's
power" by endearing the sovereign to his subjects. (Kobil,
Quality of Mercy, supra, at 586.) Like modem day presidents
and governors, the monarchs of eighteenth century England
wielded the clemency power as a political device.
Following the American Revolution, the first American
states rejected the British model. "Eight of the thirteen states
vested the authority to remit punishment in an executive leg-
islative council and the governor jointly, or in the legislature
alone." (Kobil, Quality of Mercy, supra, at 604-05.) However,
with the development of the federal Constitution, which
vested the clemency power in the president alone, and the
subsequent adoption of state constitutions, the trend among
the states was to abolish legislative control over clemency and
instead, vest the power in each state's chief executive. (Id.)
"The idea that the executive branch was the proper reposi-
tory of the clemency power rapidly gained popularity, and
most of the new states admitted to the Union allocated the
power to the governor alone." (Id.)
The California Constitutional Convention of 1878-1879
provides insight into what one state's representatives had in
mind concerning the clemency power at the time of the state's
inception. Contrary to Governor Wilson's view in 1993 that
it would be inappropriate to look into cases where the appli-
cant is claiming error during his or her judicial proceeding, in
1878, the founders of the California Constitution specifically
contemplated the executive clemency power as a tool to cor-
rect both legislative and judicial deficiencies.
Concerning judicial deficiencies, Delegate McCallum
argued:
When men shall devise a perfect government, when
there shall be no mistakes made in the administration
of government, then there will be no need of pardons
in any case, because there would be no suppositions
that there could be any injustice done in any case. But
we are all liable to err. Jurors are liable to commit er-
rors; Judges are liable to commit errors; witnesses are
liable to make mistakes and misstatements, All human
testimony is fallible.
(Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention
of the State of California, 1878-79.)
Concerning legislative deficiencies, Delegate Terry stated
rhetorically that "[t]here may be mitigating circumstances
which excuse [an] offense .... A man may commit murder
... and be technically guilty, but in such cases why should not
the Governor be allowed to pardon him?" (Id.) Incorporat-
ing both concerns, Delegate Howard argued:
A power to pardon seems indeed indispensable under
the most correct administration of the law by human
tribunals, since otherwise men would sometimes fall
prey to the vindictiveness of accusers, the inaccuracy
of testimony, and the fallibility of jurors and Courts.
(Id.)
Although recent California governors have expressed
views to the contrary, the drafters of the California Consti-
tution made crystal clear that both legislative andjudicial de-
ficiencies can give rise to the justifiable exercise of the clem-
ency power and such power is "indispensable under the most
correct administration of the law."
Four U.S. Supreme Court cases track how the perception
of the clemency power has evolved in U.S. jurisprudence.
In 1833, Chief Justice John Marshall described the pardon-
ing power as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power
entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the
individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the
law inflicts for a crime he has committed." (United States v.
Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 pet.) 150 (1833).) Nearly 100 years later,
in Biddle v. Perovich, the Court reversed course with Justice
Holmes writing that "a pardon ... is not a private act of
grace from an individual happening to possess power. It is
part of the Constitutional scheme and when granted it is
the determination of the ultimate authority that the public
welfare will be better served by inflicting less than what the
judgment was fixed." (274 U.S. 480 (1927).)
Then, in 1993, the Court issued Herrera v. Collins, one
of its most troubling cases in the area of habeas corpus ju-
risprudence. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plural-
ity, denied habeas relief to death row inmate Leonel Herrera.
In denying Herrera relief, Justice Rehnquist held that actual
innocence, absent some other procedural violation in the
convict's underlying case, is not a constitutional ground for
relief (506 U.S. at 400.) In reaching this conclusion, Rehn-
quist opined that executive clemency, rather than the court
system, is the proper mechanism for assessing claims of in-
nocence. According to Rehnquist, clemency-not the court
system-is the "fail safe" in our criminal justice system for
those wrongfully convicted.
The problem with the Court's decision in Herrera is that it
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PARDON ME
By Richard A. Ginkowski
The quirky world of executive clemency-each state and the fed-
eral government have their own guidelines and procedures-is
a place few criminal lawyers visit yet it may be one of the most
important stops for a convicted client.
The disabilities associated with convictions, such as loss of
voting rights or eligibility for state licenses, vary by jurisdiction as
well and a criminal law practitioner should know what they are in
his or her state as well as the procedures for restoration. For the
moment, let's focus on the broadest form of executive clemency,
the pardon.
For whatever reason, many criminal defense attorneys unfor-
tunately overlook counseling their convicted clients about how to
get back on the right track after their sentence is discharged. In
some cases, the ability to obtain restoration of civil rights, particu-
larly via a pardon, can make a significant impact in a person's life
and society as a whole. There are lawyers, police officers, nurses,
and others holding meaningful jobs today because a youthful in-
discretion has been forgiven.
The lawyer's role in the pardon process is important but neces-
sarily different than in traditional adversarial advocacy. The par-
don authority (usuallythe governor and his or her pardon advisors)
most likely doesn't want to hear from an applicant's lawyer. The
applicant has to make his or her own case, which means the at-
torney must function more as a teacher and coach.
Pardons aren't handed out like candy. Pardon authorities have
at least three major assessments that must be satisfied: Does the
applicant need a pardon? Is the person a good risk for clemency?
Does the public's interest favor clemency?
These are commonsense factors. No governor in his or her
RICHARD A. GINKOWSKI is assistant district attorneyJbr Kenosha
County, Wisconsin, and vice-chair of the Criminal Justice
magazine editorial board.
presupposes that the governor will actually hear the evidence
of innocence and take action in appropriate cases. Although
the statistics on the issue are sparse, the anecdotal evidence
tends to show that Rehnquist's presumption is factually un-
supported. As one observer has noted, "[w]hile a politically
accountable representative or body is now substituted for the
king as the dispenser of clemency, the pardoning power is
still exercised in an ad hoc fashion, with little regard to prin-
cipled decision making or, for that matter, consistency." (Ko-
bil, Quality of Mercy, supra, at 574.)
As a general matter, the Court has held that states are not
constitutionally required to provide clemency under the fed-
eral Constitution, and that even where a state does provide
such a mechanism, the proceeding is not subject to proce-
dural due process. However, in Ohio Adult Parole Authority
v. Woodard, the Court held that state clemency proceedings
in capital cases are subject to minimal constitutional pro-
tections, suggesting that "judicial intervention might, for
example, be warranted [if] a state official flipped a coin to
right mind wants to pardon someone who is going to commit a
serious crime afterward. Nor does the pardon authority wantto be
burdened with a slew of meritless or marginal applications.
Counsel's first step should be to learn his or her state's par-
don process. Chances are the governor's office will have "pardon
packets" available that include necessary forms and often help-
ful "suggestions" that should be thought of as "hints" for a suc-
cessful application. Applications should be filled out completely
and correctly, as incomplete or inaccurate information will likely
"deep six" the application in short order. A helpful rule is "when
in doubt, disclose."
The authority most often will want to know about the crime,
the applicant's attitude about his or her former lifestyle, what the
applicant has done with his or her life since being convicted and,
most important, why a pardon is necessary.
For example, a young single mother working as a grocery store
cashier concealed some of her income while receiving public aid
leading to her felony conviction for welfare fraud. Afterward she
continued to work at the grocery store, successfully completed
probation, paid full restitution, remained crime-free and-but for
her felony conviction-has a chance for a full-time career at the
bank inside the grocery store.
In this case, the successful applicant was able to demonstrate
remorse for her crime, an exemplary crime-free lifestyle, and had
support from her present employer, the sentencing judge, the
prosecutor in the case, and the prospective employer. The ap-
plicant demonstrated that she was a good risk for clemency, the
pardon was necessary for her career advancement, and that the
public interest would be served by favorable action.
The role of the attorney in this case was to make sure that "the
ducks were in a row" before the application was submitted, i.e,,
documentation of all relevant facts, support letters enclosed, and
court obligations satisfied. While the attorney could not represent
her at her pardon interview, he was able to guide her about ques-
tions that might be asked and the information the advisory board
determine whether to grant clemency, or in a case where the
State arbitrarily denied a prisoner any access to its clemency
process," (523 U.S. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring).)
Despite its historical roots (or perhaps because of them)
the clemency power has frequently been misunderstood, and
with even greater frequency underutilized. Both an advan-
tage and a disadvantage, one problem is that clemency is by
definition extrajudicial, a power vested in either the state gov-
ernor or an executive administrative body. Yet, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has characterized clemency as an integral part
of the criminal justice system. Herrera's characterization of
the executive pardon as the criminal justice system's fail-safe
can only be realized if the executive is willing to revisit the
substance of habeas claims denied under established judicial
standards. Properly employed, clemency "fulfills a function
that is different from simply another layer of judicial review.
Clemency is the only mechanism that allows the condemned
to tell his or her story fully It provides an opportunity for the
decision maker to consider all of the evidence and circum-
30 CRIMINAL JUSTICE U FALL 
2009
CRIMINAL JUSTICE S FALL 20093030
HeinOnline  -- 24 Crim. Just. 30 2009-2010
was likely to seek.
The former welfare mom-turned-banker is doing well and fol-
lowed advice to do one more thing: drop the governor a letter a
year or so down the road to let him know. Although they are primo
politicians, governors are also human and hearing a success story
may make it more likely that other worthy applicants are given fa-
vorable consideration.
This seemingly mundane example is nonetheless an example
of the type of applicant an authority wants to see: little or no risk
of reoffending, the pardon was needed for a legitimate reason,
and favorable action was in the public's interest. While more
challenging cases are frequently presented, pardon authorities
are less likely to be comfortable with risky applicants. Counsel's
role in such situations will necessarily be focused on how to
persuade the authority that the applicant isn't such a bad risk.
(Good luck!)
Another tip: Don't overload the authority with a stack of "me
too" support letters. Ifthe application has merit, they'll know. What
you wantto present are the "right" letters from the "right" people,
such as the prosecutor and sentencing judge and employers. Sup-
port from a mayor, sheriff, or police chief may also be helpful as
would a kind word from the victim, if possible. Substantive letters
from coworkers, teachers, and neighbors should be considered
with the key word being "substantive" as the authority wants to
gets relevant information from people in a position to know, not a
basket of fluff. Cull the letters to present an accurate picture of the
applicant showing that he or she is a good risk with appropriate
support.
In any given communitythere are likelyto be many examples of
good citizens whose youthful indiscretions are keeping them from
full participation in society. With appropriate documentation and
support, they may well be ideal candidates for clemency. While
assisting pardon applicants may not be a lucrative part of your
practice, there is likelyto be some satisfaction in helping a person
become a success story. We need more of them.
stances without the constraint of the legal technicalities that
characterize judicial proceedings." (Daniel T. Kobil, Forgive-
ness and the Law Executive Clemency and the American Sys-
tem of Justice. How to Grant Clemency in Unforgiving Tines,
31 CAP. U. L. REV. 219, 238 (2003).)
Overview of State Procedures
Article II of the U.S. Constitution provides that "The Presi-
dent... shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons
for Offenses against the United States except in Cases of Im-
peachment." The presidential pardoning power is limited to
crimes against the United States. In other words, the presi-
dent has no authority to grant clemency to a person con-
victed under state law. Although states are not required to
do so under the federal Constitution, each of the 50 states
provides, through its own constitution, for some form of
clemency. Although each state's clemency structure and pro-
cedures vary widely, some generalizations can be made.
The first generalization concerns the power structures
in each state, which fall loosely into three categories: (1) the
state's constitution grants exclusive authority to the gover-
nor; (2) the state's constitution grants exclusive authority to
an executive board; or (3) the state's constitution provides
that the governor and an executive body shall share the clem-
ency power. Following the federal model, 29 states place the
clemency power in the governor alone, "although most of
those states have established an advisory body that makes
nonbinding recommendations to the chief executive." (Ko-
bil, Quality of Mercy, supra, at 604. (AK, AR, CA, CO, HI,
IL, IA, KS, KY, ME, MD, MI, MS, MO, NJ, NM, NY, NC,
ND, OH, OR, SD, TN, VT, VA, WA, WV, WI, and WY).)
In most of these states the constitution provides that the leg-
islature shall have the power to regulate the manner of ap-
plying for clemency, but this in no way derogates from the
governor's authority.
In nine states the clemency power is vested exclusively in
an executive board. (AL, CT, GA, ID, MN, NE, NV, SC,
UT) Although vesting the clemency power in a board rather
than the governor alone may at first glance seem more demo-
cratic, in every one of these nine states the governor either
appoints the board or sits on the board. For instance, in Ne-
vada, the Board of Pardons is comprised of the governor,
justices of the state supreme court, and the attorney general.
In the remaining 12 states, the governor shares the power
to make clemency decisions with an administrative board or
panel. (AZ, DE, FL, IN, LA, MA, MT NH, OK, PA, RI,
TX). For instance, in Delaware, the governor cannot grant a
pardon or commutation in the absence of an affirmative rec-
ommendation of a majority of the Board of Pardons. The
Delaware Constitution provides that the Board of Pardons
shall consist of the chancellor, lieutenant governor, secretary
of state, state treasurer, and auditor of accounts. (Del. Const.
art. VII, § 2.)
The second generalization is that the law in each state
governing clemency can be seen as two-tiered. The first tier
is obviously the state constitution, which delegates the clem-
ency power to some executive authority, whether that be the
governor alone, an executive board, or some combination
of the two. The second tier is legislative. In conducting the
research for this article, we found that currently each state
has a legislative scheme governing a wide variety of clem-
ency issues, ranging from the procedural rules governing a
board's handling of clemency hearings, to notice provisions
requiring the clemency applicant to notify the prosecuting
attorney, sentencing judge, victim, or any combination of the
three. Over half of the states require that the clemency ap-
plicant's sentencing judge and prosecuting attorney be given
notice of the application and an opportunity to comment,
and 27 states require that the governor report his or her clem-
ency actions to the state legislature. Given that all 50 states
have both constitutional provisions and legislative provisions
governing clemency authority and procedures, in identifying
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the procedures in a given state, one must look to both the
state constitution and the particular code section. As an ex-
ample, the California structure is set forth below.
The starting point in any state is the state's constitution.
Article V, § 8 of the California Constitution provides "sub-
ject to application procedures provided by statute, the Gov-
ernor, on conditions the Governor deems proper, may grant
a reprieve, pardon, and commutation, after sentence, except
in cases of impeachment.... The Governor may not grant
a pardon or commutation to a person twice convicted of a
felony except on recommendation of the Supreme Court, 4
judges concurring."
Deconstructing the above provision, Article V grants
the governor sole authority to grant reprieves, pardons, and
commutations "on conditions [he or she] deems proper." Ar-
ticle V limits the governor's authority in three ways. First, he
or she cannot grant clemency until after conviction. Second,
he or she cannot grant clemency in cases of impeachment.
And finally, the governor cannot grant clemency to a person
who has been convicted of a felony more than once with-
out the consent of four judges of the California Supreme
Court. According to the governor's office, traditional par-
dons may be based on the applicant's innocence or rehabili-
tation. (CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S OFFIcE, How TO APPLY FOR
A PARDON (2008), available at http://gov.ca.gov/pdf/interact/
howto_apply jor a-pardon.pdf (last visited August 14,
2009).) Although Article V does not limit the governor's au-
thority to specific crimes, misdemeanor convictions are gen-
erally not considered serious enough to warrant clemency,
with the exception of certain sex offenses. (Id.) Furthermore,
it is the policy of the governor's office that applicants eligible
to apply for a certificate of rehabilitation under Penal Code
section 4852 do so before a pardon will be granted. (Id.) The
practical effect of this policy is that persons who have served
their sentences and have been out of custody for a minimum
of seven years must apply for, and receive, a certificate of re-
habilitation through the court system before applying for a
gubernatorial pardon. This policy reflects the emphasis that
California governors have placed on the "mercy" rationale
and discounts the fact that in many cases exculpatory evi-
dence does not surface until long after conviction.
Article V also provides that the governor's authority is
"subject to application procedures provided by statute." Such
provisions appear in many state constitutions, which grant
the legislature authority to create these procedures, although
this authority in no way limits the substantive reasons a gov-
ernor may exercise his or her power.
In California, the legislative provisions governing clem-
ency appear in Title 6 of the Penal Code. Title 6 contains
five chapters, and the first three set out the various proce-
dures for seeking clemency depending on the status of the
convict. Chapter 1 sets out the powers and duties of the gov-
ernor, the role of the Board of Prison Terms, and governs
the procedures for those applicants who are currently incar-
cerated (§§ 4800-4813). The second chapter, Chapter 3, sets
forth the duties of the California Supreme Court regarding
twice-convicted prisoners seeking clemency (§§ 4850-4852),
and Chapter 3.5 sets forth the procedures for those convicts
who have served their terms and are seeking a certificate of
rehabilitation (§§ 4852.014852.21).
Applicants who are currently incarcerated have two av-
enues to pursue clemency-they can be referred to the gover-
nor by the Board of Prison Terms (§ 4801), or they can apply
directly to the governor without the recommendation of the
board. The California Board of Prison Terms is composed
of nine commissioners appointed by the governor with the
advice and consent of the state senate. (Cal. Pen. Code, §
5075.) Under section 4802, twice-convicted felons must ap-
ply for pardon or commutation directly to the governor, who
is then required to transmit all papers and documents relied
upon in support of and in opposition to the application to
the Board of Prison Terms. Section 4803 allows the governor
to request the convicting judge or district attorney to furnish
a summary of the case and recommendation for or against
granting clemency. Section 4804 requires notice be sent to the
district attorney of the convicting county, and section 4807
requires a statement by the applicant identifying any com-
pensation paid to anyone assisting in procuring the pardon
or commutation. According to Governor Schwarzenegger's
Web site, he has issued three pardons since taking office. Gov-
ernor Davis granted no pardons; Governor Wilson granted
13; Governor Deukmejian granted 328; Governor Brown
granted 403; and Governor Reagan granted 575. (See The
Sentencing Project: Research and Advocacy for Reform, at
http://www.sentencingproject.org (last visited June 9, 2009).)
The Political Reality
One of the purposes of this article is to show that the clem-
ency power, constitutionally vested in each state to the chief
executive or an executive board, is broad and essential to a
just system. The unfortunate reality is that over the last three
decades, the clemency power has been significantly underuti-
lized. (For a comprehensive look at the frequency in which
the clemency power has been exercised in each state see The
Sentencing Project, supra.) As one author has noted, "there
is little doubt that in recent decades, there has been an atro-
phy of the clemency power at the state and federal levels."
(Daniel T Kobil, Forgiveness and the Law, supra, at 223.) In
our opinion, the number one reason for this underuse is a
perception on the part of state governors that the exercise of
their constitutionally granted authority will be viewed as tak-
ing a "soft" stance on the "crime issue." If mercy once was
used as a political device to endear British monarchs to their
subjects, the pendulum has swung to the opposite end of the
spectrum with modern politicians now taking a "tough on
crime" stance.
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Unlike eighteenth-century England, where executive mer-
cy was necessary in order to mitigate the harshness of a sys-
tem that imposed mandatory death sentences for more than
200 criminal acts, in the United States the political trend is
to call for increased law enforcement and harsher sentences.
The trend is embodied in policies such as the "war on drugs,"
mandatory minimum sentencing, three-strikes laws, limits on
habeas corpus petitions and appeals made by inmates, the ab-
olition of parole in some states, and the victims' rights move-
ment. These policies have not only dramatically increased
the nation's prison population, leaving politicians scrambling
to deal with the twin problems of overcrowding and too few
financial resources, but also create the atmosphere in which
governors and executive boards are unwilling to exercise
their clemency power even in appropriate cases.
One of the most troubling manifestations of the "tough
of crime" movement came with the passage of the Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).
AEDPA places severe limitations on an inmate's ability to
file a federal petition for habeas corpus, and for the first time
introduced a one-year statute of limitations that first-time
petitioners in federal court must meet to have their claims
heard. There is no exception for innocence, an issue currently
being litigated by innocence projects; however, the govern-
ment argues that the omission was intentional on the part
of Congress. Although some federal courts have resisted this
unfair and arguably unconstitutional interpretation of the
law, AEDPA has had the practical effect in case after case of
killing valid constitutional claims before they can be heard in
federal court. For those prisoners who have failed to comply
with AEDPA's draconian procedural requirements--even
prisoners who were convicted through a constitutionally de-
ficient process or those with evidence of actual innocence-
clemency is not only the last but the only avenue for relief
In the current political atmosphere, too often the merits
of the case take a subsidiary role to political concerns. As
Edward Hammock, former chairman of the New York State
Board of Parole, put it, "To get your application looked at,
you need a groundswell of support. You need mail, peti-
tions to the governor, rallies. If you're John Inmate sitting in
Auburn state prison cooling your heels, and the only friend
you've got is a correctional officer who writes the nicest letter
in the world for you.., well, what kind of chance have you
got? ... I agree it's unfair.... But it's like trying to become
president. You can be the finest candidate in the country, but
you have to be able to get the people to vote for you." (Kevin
Krajick, The Quality of Mercy, 5 CORRECTIONS MAG., June
1979, at 50 (quoting Edward Hammock).)
Maintaining a tough-on-crime political stance while
overtly declining to utilize the gubernatorial clemency power
simply fails to add up. The unwillingness to acknowledge the
critical nature of clemency and its essential role in the justice
system-in light of the prevalence of wrongful convictions
and their underlying causes-is also problematic for public
safety reasons, Put simply, if the wrong person is convicted,
then the actual criminal remains at large. Some innocence
cases have had the dual effect of exonerating the wrongly
convicted and identifying the actual perpetrator through the
FBI's Combined DNA Index System known as CODIS. Of
course, not all innocence claims are based on DNA evidence
and in many cases the wrongly convicted person has no idea
who the actual perpetrator is. However, even in cases where
the perpetrator cannot be identified, correcting the wrongful
conviction would at least result in police officials reinstituting
an investigation that would not otherwise occur.
To maintain that the sole purpose of executive clem-
ency is to lessen the consequences of a just conviction in
circumstances that cry out for mercy only makes sense in
a perfect world where there are no legislative or judicial de-
ficiencies. A power to pardon, as explicitly articulated by
drafters of the federal and state constitutions, "is indispens-
able under the most correct administration of the law by
human tribunals." With the application of DNA testing in
criminal cases, the prescience of these early drafters could
not be clearer. Moreover, to deny the extent of the problem
of wrongful convictions and their underlying causes pos-
es a serious threat to public safety. Refusing to acknowl-
edge that sometimes innocent people are convicted allows
the actual perpetrators to continue to victimize an unsus-
pecting public.
In the gubernatorial cost-benefit analysis, exercise of the
clemency power has generally been viewed as too politically
costly, and some politicians see grants of clemency as po-
litical suicide. Former governor of Louisiana, Mike Foster,
took the "tough on crime" attitude to the extreme when he
publicly announced plans to stack the pardon and parole
boards with crime victims in an effort to keep those convict-
ed in jail. (Douglas Dennis, The Politics of Mercy, 22, No.
4 ANGOLITE: THE PRISON NEWS MAG. (1997) at 26-45.) And
former California Governor Pat Brown openly admitted
that political pressure directly affected his clemency deci-
sions. "Governors are so afraid of signing their own politi-
cal death warrant that clemency is just not exercised at any-
where near the rate it was 20 years ago. The only governors
commuting death sentences are lame-duck governors who
are on their way out." (Amy Chance, Brown Targeted Over
Opposition to Death Penalty, SACRAMENTO BEE, March 6,
1994, at A21 (quoting Gerald Uelmen, former dean of
Santa Clara University Law School).) Based, however, on
the increasing public unease over wrongful convictions and
the ever-growing cost to the states of incarcerating a bur-
geoning prison population, there should be no reason why
the use of the clemency power cannot itself be seen as a
positive political tool. With state penitentiaries busting at
the seams, broader use of the clemency power becomes less
risky. The cost-benefit analysis may finally be shifting. m
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IATE SUC STUTR LIIAIN PROCDURE
*Governor has the authority to
grant reprieves and commuta-
tions to persons subject to
death penalty.
* Board of Pardons and Paroles
has authority to grant pardons.
Persons still under sentence
and not having completed 3
years of successful parole may
apply for a pardon, but it must
be based on innocence and
requires the approval of the
sentencing court or prosecut-
ing DA.
An applicant may apply for a pardon by one of the following
methods:
1) Contacting the local State Probation and Parole Office
in the area the applicant lives; 2) Contacting the Board of
Pardons by telephone at (334) 242-8700; 3) Contacting the
Board of Pardons by mail at PO. Box 302405, Montgomery,
AL 36130. (www.pardons.state.al.usA
Alaska Alaska Const. Governor has authority to grant No application for clemency An applicant begins the process by first completing and
art. Ill, § 21 pardons, commutations, and will be considered while ap- submitting an "Eligibility Determination" form to the Alaska
reprieves and to suspend and plication is being made for any Board of Parole Office (ATTN: Clemency Determination).
Alaska Stat. § remit fines and forfeitures. form of post-conviction relief, Once eligibility is positively determined, an Application
33.20.070 including a sentence reduction Form will then be provided to the potential applicant.
motion or federal habeas Requests for Eligibility Determination forms should be
corpus action. submitted to: Alaska Board of Parole, Attn: Clemency
Determination, 550 West 7t Ave., Suite # 601, Anchorage,
Clemency will not be consid- AK 99501. (www.correct.state.ak.us/corrections/Parole/
ered until after convicted per- pdf/clemencyhandbook.pdf)
son has served some portion
of sentence except in cases
of innocence or exceptional
circumstance.
Arizona Ariz. Const. art. Governor has the authority to Has to have recommendation Individuals must complete and sign the application for com-
V, § 5 grant commutations, reprieves, from the board. mutation form adopted by the Board of Executive Clemency.
and pardons, but only upon All applications made to the Governor for a commutation of
Ariz. Rev. Stat. recommendation of the Board of sentence are transmitted to the Chairperson of the Board
§ 31-401 Executive Clemency. of Executive Clemency for review. (www.azboec.gov/
documents/400.13.D.pdf)
Arkansas Ark. Const. art. Governor has the authority to Application sent directly to Governor's office. Application
VI, § 18 grant reprieves, commutations, available at http://govemorarkansas.gov/pdf/
and pardons except in cases of clemency/0808executiveclemency-app.pdf.
Ark. Code Ann. impeachment and treason.
§ 16-93-204
California Cal.Const. art. Governor has the authority to Governor may not grant 2 methods: (1) if eligible, an applicant may seek a certificate
V, § 8 grant reprieves, pardons, and clemency to persons twice of rehabilitation under Pen. Code § 4852 and, if granted,
commutations after sentence, convicted of a felony w/o seek a pardon from the Governor's office, or (2) the applicant
Pen. Code, § consent of 4 justices of the can apply for a pardon directly to the Governor's office.
4800 et seq. Cal. Supreme Court.
Colorado Colo. Const. art. Governor has full and absolute Inmates serving a single life An application is initiated by the inmate with the assistance
IV, § 7 discretion in clemency matters, sentence must have served of the Department of Corrections' Case Managers. Ap-
He may grant unconditional 1/3 of their sentence to parole plicants must complete Executive Clemency Advisory Board
Colo. Rev. Stat. pardons, commutations, and eligibility or ten full years, (ECAB) Application Eligibility Criteria for Commutation of
§ 16-17-101 reprieves, whichever is less. Sentence & Character Certificate. Copies of the completed
application are sent to the sentencing judge and district
Inmates serving a life sentence attorney in the district where the conviction took place. The
with consecutive sentences Governor has final discretion to grant, refuse or table all
must serve ten full years. clemency applications. (www.cjpf.org/clemency/Colorado.
html)
All other sentences must serve
1/3 of their actual sentence or
ten years, whichever is less.
Connecticut Conn. Const. *Governor has the authority to Sentence of 8 years or Application sent to Board of Pardons and Paroles by mail at:
art. IV, §13 grant reprieves. more: eligible after 4 years. Pardon Unit
* Board of Pardons (appointed Sentence of less than 8 years: Board of Pardons and Paroles
Conn. Gen. by Governor) has the authority eligible after serving 50% of 55 West Main Street, Suite 520
Stat. § 54-124a to grant pardons and commute the sentence. Waterbury, CT 06702.
sentences.
The eligibility requirements The Board holds two hearings per year (May and Nov.). The
may be waived by the Board deadline for the May docket is March 15. The deadline for
upon application and for the Nov. docket is Sept. 15. (www.ct.gov/doc/lib/doc/PDF/
compelling reasons. form/PardonClemencylnstructions.pdf)
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Alabama Ala. Const. art.
V, § 124
Ala. Code §
15-22-37
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STT SUC STUTR LIIAION PROCDURE
Govemor has the authority to
grant pardons, reprieves, and
commutations but only upon
recommendation in writing of
Board of Pardons after a full
hearing.
Pardons or reprieves in excess
of six months and all com-
mutations must receive the
affirmative written recommen-
dation of the majority of the
Board of Pardons.
eApplicant must obtain a copy of certified copy of the
court docket and sentencing order for each guilty charge.
Applicant must then complete the Board of Pardons cover
sheet, including reasons for applying, a history of the
case, and a statement of all pending proceedings.
*The presiding Judge, Attorney General, and Chief of
Police must all be notified at least 37 days before hearing
date. (http://pardons.delaware.gov/services/pardinst.
shtml).
Florida Fla. Const. art. Governor has the authority to Approval of two members of Applicant must complete and submit an application to the
IV, § 8 grant reprieves not exceeding the cabinet required to grant coordinator of the Office of Executive Clemency. (https://fpc.
60 days, and, with the approval pardons, restore civil rights, state.fl.us/Clemency.htm)
Fla. Stat. § 940 of two members of the cabinet, commute punishment and
grant full or conditional pardons, remit fines and forfeitures for
restore civil rights, commute offenses.
punishment, and remit fines.
Georgia Ga. Const art. * Board of Pardons and Paroles Majority vote of the Board is @There is no standardized application; an inmate or
IV, § II (appointed by Gov.) has the required for action in all clem- someone representing an inmate may write to the Board
authority to grant pardons, ency cases. to request clemency. The only information that needs to
Ga. Code Ann. reprieves and commutations be submitted is the inmate's name, prisoner number, and
§ 42-9-42 after conviction and to remove reason(s) why clemency should be granted. (http://rules.
all civil and political disabilities. sos.statega.us/cgi-hin/page.cgi?g--STATEBOARD_
*Governor has the authority to OF_PARDONS AND PAROLES_%2FRULES%2Findex.
temporarily suspend sentences html&d=l)
in cases of capital punishment
and treason.
Hawaii Haw. Const. Governor has the authority to Application to Hawaii Paroling Authority, including 2 char-
art. V, § 5 grant reprieves, commutations, acter affidavits. (http://hawaii.gov/psd/attached-agencies/
and pardons after conviction. hpa)
Idaho Idaho Const. Board of Pardons (appointed Commission has full and final Application to Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole.
art. IV, § 7 by Governor) has authority, as authority to grant pardons, ex- The only acceptable form is the one provided by the Corn-
provided by statute, to grant cept with respect to sentences mission. Application available at http://ww2.state.id.us/
Idaho Code commutations and pardons. for murder, voluntary man- parole/pardons.htm.
Ann. § 20-210 slaughter, rape, kidnapping,
lewd and lascivious conduct
with a minor, and manufac-
ture or delivery of controlled
substances. In the cases
listed above, the Commission's
decision to grant a pardon shall
constitute a recommendation
only to the governor.
Illinois Ill. Const. art. Governor has the authority to No petition will be accepted Send application to the Illinois Prisoner Review Board and
V, § 12 grant pardons, commutations for review within one year of serve copy on the convicting judge and State's Attorney of
and reprieves, the date of the denial of a prior the county of conviction. (http://ww.state.il.us/prbA
730 111. Comp. petition.
Stat. 5/3-3-1
Indiana Ind. Const. art. Governor has the authority to Five -year waiting period and Applications filed with Parole Board. Instructions and ap-
5, § 17 grant commutations, pardons, evidence of rehabilitation. plication available at http://www.in.gov/idoc/2324.htm.
and reprieves, but may not grant
Ind. Code § pardons without consent of the
11-9-2-1 parole board.
Iowa Iowa Const. art. Governor has the authority to Before granting pardon or Application may be sent to Board of Parole or to the
IV, § 16 grant pardons, commutations, commutations the governor Governor directly Applications to the Board must be on
and reprieves, remit fines and must first obtain the advice of the form provided by the board, which may be obtained by
Iowa Code §§ forfeitures, and grant certificates the Board of Parole. contacting the board's business office. (http://www.bop.
914.1-914.7 restoring citizenship rights. state.ia.us/pdf/07-01-2009.205.pdf)
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Delaware Del. Const. art.
VII, § 1
Del. Code Ann.
tit. 11 § 4301
et seq.
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STAT SORC STUCUR LIITTIN PRCDUE
oGovemor has the authority to
grant pardons, commutations,
reprieves in capital cases, and
impose restrictions on clem-
ency grants.
*The Governor is required to
seek the advice of the Parole
Board before acting but is not
bound to follow it.
Applicant must complete and forward Notice of Clemency
Application-Sentencing Form to the Judge, Prosecuting
Attorney, Sheriff and Police Chief located in the county of
conviction.
Two copies of a Request for Publication Form must be sent
to the official county newspaper in the county of conviction.
Two copies of the Application for Clemency must be sent to
the Parole Board.
All forms available at www.doc.ks.gov/kpb/clemency.
Kentucky Ky. Const. § 77, Governor has the author- Applications for commutation of sentences and pardons
§ 150 ity to grant pardons (full and must be made directly to the Governor Applications for
conditional), commutations, and restorations of civil rights must be obtained by contacting
Ky. Rev. Stat. reprieves and to remit fines and the Department of Corrections, Division of Probation and
Ann. § 439.450 forfeitures. Parole. These applications are processed by the Depart-
ment of Corrections and then submitted to the Governor's
Office. (http://sos.ky.gov/executive/journalA
Louisiana La. Const art e Governor has complete author- Applicants serving life Every application must be submitted to the Board of
IV § 5 ity to grant reprieves, sentence must serve 15 years Pardons on the form approved by the Board. Applications
- Governor must have recom- from the date of sentence, un- must be received by the 1 5h of the month to be placed on
La. Rev. Stat. mendation of the Board of less sufficient evidence exists the docket for consideration the following month.
Ann. § 15:572.1 Pardons (appointed by Gov.) which would have caused him Application available at http://www.doc.a.gov/view.
to grant pardons or commute to have been found not guilty. php?cat=13.
sentences.
Maine Me. Const. art. *Governor has authority to For commutation of sentence, Secretary of State receives application and forwards to
V, pt. 1, § 11 pardon except in cases of must have served at least Dept. of Corrections. Board on Executive Clemency reviews
impeachment, subject to of original sentence. For applications and information gathered by the Dept. of Cor-
Me. Rev. Stat. regulation relative to manner pardon 5 year waiting period rections to determine whether a hearing will be granted.
Ann. tit. 15, § of applying. after completion of sentence
2129 & tit. 34- *Pardons Advisory Board ap- and the following grounds are Application available at http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/
A, § 5210(4) pointed by Gov, ineligible to apply: boards/pardons.pdf.
*Parole Board authorized, at To rectify alleged errors in the
request of Gov. , to investigate judicial system; for operat-
and hold hearings. ing under the influence; for
seeking to have one's name
removed from a sex offender
registry; where the petitioner
has more than one serious
criminal conviction.
These conditions can be
waived by the Governor's
Board on Executive Clemency.
Maryland Md. Const. art *Governor has the authority to No petition for pardon will be Individuals must write to the Maryland Parole Commission
!1, § 20 grant reprieves, pardons, remit considered while the petitioner requesting an application. Commission directs the Division
fines and forfeitures and to is incarcerated, of Parole and Probation to conduct an Executive Clemency
Md. Code Ann. commute sentences. investigation. Recommendations then sent to Gov.
§ 7-202, & Md. *Parole Commission investi-
Regs. Code tit. gates and advises on pardon
12, § 08.01.16 applications on request of Gov.
Massachusetts Mass. Const. Governor may not grant pardon 15-yearwaiting period for Pardon and Commutation applications available at the
pt. 2, ch. II, sec. w/o advice and consent of the felonies and 10-year period for Mass. Executive Office of Public Safety and Security
I, art. VIII Govemor's Council. misdemeanors. website. Completed applications should be mailed to the
*General Court has authority to Governor's Council in Boston.
Mass. Gen. prescribe terms and conditions
Laws ch. 127, upon which pardons may be
§ 152 granted in felony cases.
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Kansas Kan, Const. art.
1, § 7
Kan. Stat Ann.
§ 22-3701 et
seq.
I
HeinOnline  -- 24 Crim. Just. 36 2009-2010
STT OU S RUTURE IM IITATONS ROCEURE
*Governor has the authority to
grant pardons, commutations,
and reprieves.
*Gov. required to obtain recom-
mendation of Parole Board
prior to grant, but is not bound
by its decision.
Board will accept an applica-
tion only one time every two
years.
Clemency application needs to be filed with the Office of
the Parole & Commutation Board. Board must conduct
investigation and make determination on whether to hold
hearing within 270 days of application. Application avail-
able at Michigan Department of Corrections website.
Minnesota Minn. Const. *The Board of Pardons, made *Unanimous vote of the Board Applications sent to Secretary of Board of Pardons, who
art. V, § 7 up of the governor, the attorney is required for pardons and makes recommendations to the Board.
general, and the chief justice of commutations.
Minn. Stat. § the supreme court, has power •Consent of two Board Board of Pardons
638 to grant reprieves and pardons. members is required for a re- 1450 Energy Park Dr. Suite 200
*Director of Correction conducts hearing of a clemency action St. Paul, MN 55108
investigations and makes rec- that was earlier denied. (651) 642-0284
ommendations to the Board.
Mississippi Miss. Const. Governor has authority to grant Applicant must complete an Application for Clemency and
art. 5, § 124 pardons, reprieves, remit fines submit it to the Governor's office. Applications are available
and stay forfeitures and to corn- by contacting the Govemors Legal Division.
Miss. Code mute sentences.
Ann. § 47-7-5
Missouri Mo. Const. art. oGovemor has full authority to Inmates are eligible. Indi- All applications for pardon, commutation of sentence or
IV, § 7 grant pardons, commutations, viduals not confined must wait reprieve should be referred to the Board of Probation and
and reprieves, three years from incarceration. Parole for investigation. (www.doc.mo.gov/division/prob/
Mo. Rev. Stat. * Board of Probation and Parole ExecClem.htm)
§ 217.800 (appointed by Gov.) required to
review applications and make
non-binding recommendations.
Montana Mont. Const. Governor may grant pardon only Recommendation for clem- Application to Board of Pardons and Parole, which may
art. VI, § 12 upon recommendation of Board ency will be made only upon hold a hearing in meritorious cases and is required to hold
of Pardons and Parole (appointed exceptional and compelling hearings in capital cases. Favorable recommendations are
Mont. Code by Gov.), except in capital cases. circumstances. forwarded to Governor.
Ann. § 46-23-
104
Nebraska Neb. Const. art. Board of Pardons (comprised of According to the Board of Applications may be submitted to the Board of Pardons'
IV, § 13 Governor, Secretary of State, Pardons "the usual practice administrative office or to the Secretary of State. Applica-
and Attorney General) has the ... is to hear only those felony tions must be submitted on the form prescribed by the
Neb. Rev. Stat. authority to grant respites, cases where approximately ten Board. Application available at www.pardons.state.ne.us/
§§ 83-1,126 et reprieves, pardons and corn- years has elapsed and those pardons.html.
seq. mutations and to remit fines and misdemeanor cases where
forfeitures, except in cases of three years has elapsed."
treason and impeachment.
Nevada Nev. Const. art. State Board of Pardons (corn- A majority of the Board Send notarized application to the Board of Pardons Com-
5, §§ 13,14 prised of the governor, justices can grant a pardon, but the missioners. Application available at http://www.pardons.
of the supreme court, and the Governor must be among the nv.gov/.
Nev. Rev. Stat. attorney general) has the author- majority.
§ 213.010 ity to remit fines and forfeitures,
commute punishment, grant
pardons, and restore citizenship
rights.
New N.H. Const. pt. Pardon power is vested in the On all petitions to the governor and council for pardon or
Hampshire 2, art. 52 governor, "by and with the ad- commutation, written notice must be given to the State's
vice of the [Executive] Council," counsel, and such notice to others as the governor may
N.H. Rev. Stat. an elected body that advises the direct. (N.H. Rev. Stat. 4:21)
Ann. §§ 4:21 governor generally in carrying
to 4:28 out his duties.
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SATE SUC TUTR LIIAIN PROCDURE
Governor has the authority
to remit or suspend fines and for-
feitures, to commute capital pun-
ishment, and to grant pardons
and reprieves.
The N.J. Const. provides for
the creation of a commission
to assist and advise the gov-
emor on pardons, but no such
panel has been created.
Individuals must make written request for application by
writing to the Clemency Investigator at the New Jersey
State Parole Board.
New Mexico N.M. Const. Governor has complete authority If an applicant is denied execu- Applications to governor's office identifying type of clem-
art. V, § 6 to grant pardons and reprieves, tive clemency, the applicant is ency sought and reasons for consideration. The governor
and to commute sentences, not eligible to reapply until 4 may, in his discretion, refer requests for executive clemency
N.M. Stat. Ann. years following the application, to the Parole Board for investigation and recommendation.
§ 31-13-1(c)
New York N.Y Const. art. Governor has the authority to Absent exceptional circum- The Executive Clemency Bureau within the Division of
4, § 4 grant commutations, reprieves, stances a pardons will not be Parole screens clemency applications and responds to
and pardons. considered if there are other letters from applicants.
N.Y Exec. Law legal remedies available.
§ 259
North Carolina N.C. Const. art. eGovernor has unlimited author- Governor's Clemency Office Send completed clemency request to the Governor's
III, § 5 ity to grant pardons, commuta- will not consider applica- Clemency Office. Application should include all certified
tions, and reprieves. tions that are currently being court documents, including indictments, judgment and
N.C. Gen. Stat. *Post Release Supervision appealed or seeking habeas commitment orders, plea agreement (if applicable), and all
§ 143B-266 and Parole Commission has corpus relief, other court documents that are needed to fully understand
authority to assist governor in the case.
investigating applications.
North Dakota N.D. Const. art. Pardon power vested in Application for commutation, reprieve, pardon, or remission
5, § 7 Governor. of fine must be made with the clerk of the Pardon Advisory
Gov. may appoint a pardon Board on a form prescribed by the clerk. (N.D. Cent. Code
N.D. Cent. advisory board (comprised of at- 12-55/1-06)
Code § 12- torney general, two members of
55.1-02 parole board, and two citizens).
Ohio Ohio Const. art. Governor has the authority to All applications must be made in writing to the Adult Parole
Ill, § 11 grant pardons, reprieves, and Authority. Application and instructions available at wwv.
commutations drc.state.oh.us/web/ExecClemency.htm).
Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2967.07
Oklahoma Okla. Const art. Governor, upon recommendation Must have recommendation Applicant must submit completed application form and
VI, § 10 of the Board, has the authority of the Board before granting documents relating to conviction to the Pardon and Parole
to grant pardons, paroles, and pardons, paroles or commuta- Board. Application available at wwwppbstate.ok.us/.
Okla. Stat. tit. commutations In the absence tions.
57, § 332 of Board approval, he may grant
reprieves or leaves of absence
under 60 days.
Oregon Or. Const. art. Governor has the authority to If a prospective applicant Applications filed with Governor's Office, with a copy served
V, § 14 grant pardons, reprieves, and qualifies to have his or her on prosecuting attorney, State Board of Parole and Post-
commutations. He also has conviction eliminated under Prison Supervision, and Dept. of Corrections. Pardon infor-
Or. Rev. Stat. § power to remit all forfeitures and ORS 137.225, he or she must mation packet can be obtained by contacting the governor's
144.649 penalties. seek relief through the courts legal counsel. The Governor's legal counsel recommends
and is ineligible for clemency, that before sending application to governor, the applicant
should first serve copies on the above listed entities.
Pennsylvania Pa. Const. art. Governor has the authority Unanimous recommenda- According to the Board of Pardons' website, the only means
4, § 9 to remit fines and forfeitures, tion in writing of the Board is of obtaining a pardon application is through the mail directly
grant pardons, reprieves and required in death penalty cases from the Board. To obtain an application send payment in
37 Pa. Code § commutations, but only with the or life imprisonment. the amount of $8.00, made payable to the Commonwealth
81.221 affirmative recommendation of of Pennsylvania. Personal checks are not accepted.
majority of the Board of Pardons. Enclose a self-addressed business size envelope with $.61
postage. (http://sites.state.pa.us/PA-Exec/BOP
Governor, with the advice and
consent of the senate, has the
authority to grant pardons and to
exercise all other state clemency
powers.
Extremely rare. No pardon
has been issued in more than
a decade.
Contact Special Counsel to Governor
CRIMINAL JUSTICE I FALL 2009
New Jersey N.J. Const. art
5, § 2
N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 2A:167-5
Rhode Island R.I. Const. art.
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I1 STAT SOURCE STUCTURE LIMITATIONS PROICEDURE
Govemor nas autority to grant
reprieves and commute death
sentences, but all other clem-
ency authority vested by statute
in Probation, Parole, and Pardon
Board, which is comprised of 7
members appointed by the Gov.
inmates may oe consierea
any time prior to becoming
parole-eligible upon proof of
the most extraordinary circum-
stances. The Board decides,
based upon the application
and findings, whether the
evidence demonstrates such
circumstances.
Appiicani must suomit appiication TO me uepl. or r'roearion,
Parole and Pardon Services. Application available on the
agency's website at www.dppps.sc.gov/pardon-down-
load ..application.html. The application consists of a written
application, letters of reference and a fee of $100.
South Dakota S.D. Const. art. The Governor has independent Send application to Board of Pardons and Parole. Applica-
4, § 3 constitutional authority, or alter- tion and instructions available on the South Dakota Dept. of
natively, may delegate authority Corrections website at http://doc.sd.gov/forms/clemency/.
S.D. Codified to the Board of Pardons and
Laws § 24- Parole for recommendation.
14-1
Tennessee Tenn. Const. * Governor has the authority to Send application to the Board of Probation and Parole
art. Ill, § 6 grant pardons, reprieves, and Executive Clemency Unit. Pardon and commutation ap-
commutations. plication available on the Board's website at wwvv.tn.gov/
Tenn. Code e Gov. may also issue exonera- bopp/bopp.bocontents.htm?#ExecutiveClemency
Ann. § 40-27- tions, signifying innocence.
101
Tenn. Comp.
R. & Regs. §
1100-1-1-15
Texas Tex. Const. art. Governor, upon the recom- Gov may not issue pardon Applicant files petition with Board Executive Clemency
IV, § 11 mendation of the Texas Board of except upon recommendation Section, which conducts an investigation. Individual board
Pardons and Paroles (appointed from majority of Board. members review each case and cast their vote w/o consult-
Tex. Gov't Code by Gov.), has the authority to ing each other.
Ann. § 508.047 remit fines and forfeitures, grant
37 Tex. reprieves, commutations and
Admin. Code § pardons.
141.111
Utah Utah Const art o Board of Pardons and Paroles Five-year waiting period and Application sent to Board of Pardons and Parole. (http://
VII, § 12 (appointed by Gov.) has the exhaustion of legal remedy bop.utah.gov/)
authority to remit fines and for- requirement, including ex-
Utah Code Ann. feitures, commute sentences, pungement.
§ 77-27-5 and grant pardons.
o Governor has the power to
Utah Admin. grant reprieves and respites
Code § 671-
315
Vermont Vt. Const. chap. Governor has the authority to Policy of Governors office to Applicant should send application directly to governor,
II, § 20 grant pardons and to remit fines, grant clemency only for "com- which may then be forwarded to Parole Board for investiga-
pelling reasons," including tion and recommendation.
Vt. Stat. Ann. inability to get job.
tit. 28, § 453
Virginia Va. Const. art. Governor has exclusive authority Three-year waiting period for All petitions for pardon require applicant to send the Gover-
V, § 12 to grant pardons, commutations, nonviolent applicants, five nor a letter clearly stating your request for pardon and what
and reprieves, to remit fines, and years for violent and drug type of pardon requested. (vww.commonwealth.virginia.
Va. Stat. Ann. § to restore civil rights, offenses. gov/JudicialSystem/Clemency/pardons.cfm)
53.1-136
Washington Wash. Const. Governor has authority to Since 1965, no Washington Application filed with Clemency and Pardons Board, which
art. Ill, § 9 commute death sentences to governor has intervened to cannot recommend clemency until a public hearing has
imprisonment for life at hard overturn a death sentence, been held and prosecuting attorney is notified, who shall
Wash. Rev. labor and to grant pardons and and in only one instance was also notify victims, survivors of victims, witnesses, and law
Code § reprieves, an execution postponed by a enforcement.
9.94A.880 Governor's action. (www.atg.
wa.gov/page.aspx?id=2342).
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STAT SORC STUCUR LIITTIN PRCDUE
uovemor nas autnoriy to remit
fines and penalties, to commute
capital punishment and to grant
reprieves and pardons.
'aroons rareiy grantee - only
121 in 36 years
Petitioner must request application materials from Gover-
nor's office.
Wisconsin Wis. Const. art. *Govemor has absolute Five-year waiting period from Send application to the Governor's Pardon Advisory Board.
V, § 6 discretion in the granting of completion of sentence, includ- Information and application can be requested from the gov-
clemency. ing probation. Not available to emor's office. Information available at the Wisconsin Dept.
Wis. Stat. § *Governor appoints a non- misdemeanants. of Corrections website. (www.wi-doc.com/index-manage-
304.09 statutory Pardon Advisory ment.htm)
Board, including members from
Dept. of Justice, Dept. of Cor-
rections, four public members,
and Governor's Legal Counsel.
Wyoming Wyo. Const. Governor has authority to remit Policy of Governor usually Application directly to governor. Request application from
art. 4, § 5 fines and forfeitures, and to excludes persons convicted of governor's office.
grant reprieves, commutations, sex crimes.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. and pardons.
§ 7-13-803 et
seq.
CHAIR'S COUNSEL (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1)
truly transcending the walls of the courtroom, collaborating
with social service agencies, acting as problem solvers, and
exploring innovative strategies at a community level.
By the early 1990s, the view of prosecutors as simple case
processors was evolving. Prosecutors began to look beyond
their essentially reactive approach to crime and to recognize
that, with contacts both inside and outside the courtroom,
they were uniquely positioned to forge partnerships and
linkages, act as agents of change in the criminal justice sys-
tem, and promote a paradigm shift in how to address crime.
They adopted crime prevention as a key component of their
mission.
The new strategy has taken root over the last two decades
in district attorney offices across the country. Different ju-
risdictions have tweaked the paradigm in distinct ways, em-
phasizing certain aspects over others (for example, targeting
quality of life crime in a definite geographic area or focusing
on treatment alternatives to incarceration), but commitment
to community engagement and to crime prevention remains
constant (see ROBERT V. WOLF and JOHN L. WORRALL, CEN-
TER FOR COURT INNOVATION AND APRI, LESSONS FROM THE
FIELD: TEN COMMUNITY PROSECUTION LEADERSHIP PROFILES
(November 2004)). No single term truly encompasses all
these different programs, but "community prosecution" is
the most commonly used umbrella label. According to the
National District Attorneys Association's National Center
for Community Prosecution, the proactive, collaborative,
problem-solving approach is distinguished by certain key
principles: (1) recognizing the community's role in pub-
lic safety; (2) engaging in problem solving; (3) establishing
and maintaining partnerships; and (4) evaluating outcomes
of activities. The American Prosecutors Research Institute
has issued several reports exploring the varied dimensions
of community prosecution and the redefinition of prosecu-
tors' roles (see, e.g., M. ELAINE NUGENT, PATRICIA FANFLIK,
and DELENE BROMIRSKI, APRI, THE CHANGING NATURE OF
PROSECUION, COMMUNITY PROSECUTION vs. TRADITIONAL
PROSECUTION APPROACHES (February 2004)).
State and local prosecutors have increasingly teamed
up with entities outside the criminal justice system and built
partnerships to curb criminal behavior by addressing its root
causes, and this is especially true in jurisdictions serving large
urban populations. For example, in response to a 2005 nation-
wide survey of state prosecutor offices, 66 percent answered
that they used tools other than criminal prosecution to ad-
dress community problems; the number was 95 percent for
full-time offices serving populations of one million or more.
Seventy percent of prosecutor offices reported a formal or
informal relationship with community associations; 92 per-
cent in large offices. And although only 24 percent assigned
prosecutors to community-related activities, that number
jumped to 84 percent for large offices. (Steven W Perry, Pros-
ecutors in State Courts, 2005, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. (U.S.
Dep't of Justice), July 2006 at 9).) Space here does not permit
a description of the efforts of these prosecutor offices, but
the National Center for Community Prosecution publishes
a newsletter that reports on several of the programs reflected
in these statistics (available at www.ndaa.org/publications/
newsletters/building-bridgesscontentshtm).
Additionally, prosecutors have become more willing to di-
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vert both juvenile and adult offenders, even felony offenders,
into alternatives to incarceration, as can be seen in the prolif-
eration of problem-solving courts, most notably drug courts
(which, from one court in Florida in 1989, now number over
2,100 across the United States). Prosecutors are often key
players in these courts, heavily involved in their establishment
and operation. Prosecutors have also created their own diver-
sion programs, targeted at different groups, such as youthful
offenders, chronic drug addicts, and mentally ill offenders.
Although federal prosecutors have in general been slow-
er than their state counterparts to embrace this new pro-
active, holistic approach to crime reduction, especially the
use of alternatives to incarceration, change may be on the
horizon. Fifteen years ago, when he was the U.S. attorney
for Washington, D.C., Attorney General Eric Holder broke
new ground by starting a community prosecution program
in that office, a program still in place today. This year, in his
remarks at the ABA Annula Meeting in Chicago, Attorney
General Holder, still clearly committed to innovative solu-
tions, declared that,
getting smart on crime means thinking about crime
in context-not just reacting to the criminal act, but
developing the government's ability to enhance pub-
lic safety before the crime is committed and after the
former offender is returned to society.
The attorney general, among other things, specifically
endorsed greater use of drug treatment alternatives to in-
carceration for nonviolent addicted offenders. Perhaps,
federal prosecutors nationwide will now increasingly shift
from functioning as case processors to becoming problem
solvers.
Some question the wisdom of this broadened vision of a
prosecutor's role, and certainly, further research and evalu-
ation of the myriad prosecutor programs would provide
useful insights into their most effective aspects. But, experi-
ence already tells us that we cannot prison-build ourselves
to a safer society Almost all inmates eventually leave jail
and prison, and a large number reoffend. A prosecutor's
office that, in blinkered fashion, focuses on just convicting
and locking up offenders is ignoring the reality of criminal
recidivism. The proactive, collaborative approach does not
entail an abandonment of the district attorney's traditional
tools for crime reduction: investigation, prosecution, and
conviction. Rather, it means complementing those tools
with new ones: diversion, collaboration, community par-
ticipation, and research-based innovation. By enlisting the
aid of entities outside the criminal justice sphere and by
exploring fresh methods to reduce recidivism, prosecutors
can increase public safety and help foster mutual respect
between law enforcement and the citizenry.
The ABA Criminal Justice Standards on the Prosecution
Function, approved in 1992, essentially focus on a prosecu-
tor's professional conduct as an investigator and case proces-
sor. However, the Standards do note that the prosecutor is
an administrator of justice," has "[t]he duty ... to seek jus-
tice, not merely convict," and has, as an important function,
"to seek to reform and improve the administration of crimi-
nal justice." (Standard 3-1.2.) That commitment to justice,
which in its broadest sense undergirds a fair and safe society,
informs the new vision of the prosecutor's expanded role.
It is unclear whether Congress and the president will de-
cide that the time has come for a new National Criminal
Justice Commission. However, it is clear (even without the
insights of a commission) that there will always be room
for improvement in our criminal justice system. We should
never be satisfied with the status quo as long as people per-
petrate crimes against others and violence threatens the
public weal. All those in the criminal justice system, includ-
ing prosecutors, should take these words of the 1967 com-
mission to heart:
The Commission finds . . . that the officials of the
criminal justice system itself must stop operating, as
all too many do, by tradition or by rote. They must re-
examine what they do. They must be honest about the
system's shortcomings with the public and with them-
selves. They must be willing to take risks in order to
make advances. They must be bold. 0
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